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P.V PROF. TH. RIBOT.
IN passing from the origin of speech- to the study of its develop-
ment, we enter upon firmer ground. Although this develop-
ment has not occurred uniformly in every race, and the linguists
—
who are here our guides—do not always agree in fixing its phases,
it is nevertheless the surest indication of the march of the human
mind in its self-analysis in passing from extreme confusion to de-
liberate differentiation ; while the materials are sufficiently abun-
dant to admit of an objective study of intellectual psychogenesis,
based upon language.
This attempt has nothing in common with the "general or
philosophical grammar" of the beginning of this century. The
Idealogues who founded this had the pretension, while taking lan-
guage as their basis, to analyse the fundamental categories of in-
telligence : substance, quality, action, relation. A laudable enter-
prise, but one which, by reason of the method employed, could
only be abortive. Knowing only the classical or modern languages,
the products of a long civilisation, they had no suspicion of the
embryonic phases ; accordingly, they made a theoretical construc-
tion, the work of logicians rather than of psychologists. Any pos-
itive genetic investigation was inaccessible to them; they were
lacking in material, and in instruments. If by a comparison bor-
rowed from geology, the adult languages are assimilated to the
Quaternary layer; the Tertiary, Secondary, and Primary strata
will correspond with certain idioms of less and less complexity
which themselves contain the fossils of psychology. These lower
forms—the semi-organised or savage languages which are a hun-
dred times more numerous than the civilised languages—are now
familiar to us ; hence there is an immense field for research and
1 Translated from the French by Frances A. Welby.
2 See the April Open Court.
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comparison. This retrogression to the primitive leads to a point
that several linguists have designated by a term borrowed from
biology: it is the protoplasmic state "without functions of gram-
matical categories" (Hermann Paul). How is it that speech
issued from this undifferentiated state, and constituted little by lit-
tle its organs and functions ? This question is interesting to the
linguist on certain sides, to the psychologist on others. For us it
consists in seeking how the human mind, through long groping,
conquered and perfected its instrument of analysis.
I. At the outset of this evolution, which we are to follow step
by step, we find the hypothesis of a primitive period, the so-called
roots, and it is worth our while to pause over this a little. Roots
—whatever may be our opinion as to their origin—are in effect
general terms. But in what sense?
Chinese consists of 500 monosyllables which, thanks to varieties
of intonation, sufficed for the construction of the spoken language
;
Hebrew, according to Renan, has about 500 roots ; for Sanskrit
there is no agreement. According to a bold hypothesis of Max
Miiller, it is reducible to 121, perhaps less, and "these few seeds
have produced the enormous intellectual vegetation that has cov-
ered the soil of India from the most distant antiquity to the pres-
ent day.^ Whatever their number may be, the question for us re-
duces itself into knowing their primitive intellectual content, their
psychological value. Here we are confronted by two very differ-
ent theses. For one camp, roots are a reality; for the other, they
are the simple residuum of analysis.
"Roots are the phonetic types produced by a force inherent
in the human mind ; they were created by nature," etc., etc. Thus
speaks Max Miiller. Whitney, who is rarely of the same mind,
says, notwithstanding, that all the Indo-European languages are
descended from one primitive, monosyllabic language, "that our
ancestors talked with one another in simple syllables indicative of
ideas of prime importance, but wanting all designation of their re-
lations."
In the other camp it is sustained that roots are the result of
learned analysis, but that there is nothing to prove that they really
existed (Sayce) ; that they are reconstructed by comparison and
generalisation; that, e. g., in the Aryan languages, roots bear
much the same relation to Sanskrit, Greek, and Latin words as
Platonic ideas to the objects of the real world " (Br^al). It has
been calculated that the number of articulate sounds which the
1 This list may be found in The Science of Thought, p. 406.
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human voice is capable of producing amounts to three hundred
and eighty-five. These sounds, for physiological reasons, consti-
tute a fundamental theme in the various words created by man.
Later on, linguists in comparing the vocables used in different lan-
guages, established the frequent recurrence of certain sounds
common to several words. These have been isolated, but we must
not see in them aught besides extracts. Moreover, "the first stam-
merings of man have nothing in common with phonetic types so
arrested in form and abstract in signification, as dliCi, to place, vid,
to see, ))ian, to think, and other analogous words."
To sum up. In the first thesis roots come into existence, ub
initio ; words are derived from them by reduplication, flexions, af-
fixes, suffixes, etc.; there is the trunk upon which a whole swarm
of languages has proliferated.
In the second thesis, words come first; then the common ele-
ment, disengaged by analysis, but which never really existed in
the pure and primitive condition.
Whether the one opinion or the other be adopted, I see no
conclusion to be drawn from it save that the first terms designated
qualities or manners of being, varying with the race. The first
thesis seems the more apt in revealing to us the primitive forms of
abstraction and generalisation. If it be selected, despite its fra-
gility, one finds in the list of roots (even when most reduced) an
extraordinary mixture of terms applied to the most disparate
things (e. g., tears, break, measure, milk, to choose, to clean, to
vomit, cold, to fear, etc.). To assert with Max Miiller (from whom
I borrow the preceding terms) that "there are the one hundred
and twenty-one original concepts, the primitive intellectual bag-
gage of the Aryan family" is to employ an unfortunate formula,
for nothing could less resemble concepts than the contents of this
list. If the second thesis be adopted, the root then being nothing
but "the exposed kernel of a family of words," "a phonogram,"
analogous to composite photographs, formed like these by a con-
densation of the similarities between several terms, then clearly
primitive abstraction and generalisation must be sought in words,
and not in roots. ^
1 How were primitive terms (roots or words) formed ? A much-debated and still unsolved
question. Man had at his disposal one primary element, the interjection. By all accounts this
remained sterile, unfertile ; it did not give birth to words ; it remained in articulate language as
a mark of its emotional origin. A second proceeding was that of imitation with the aid of sound
onomatopoeia. From antiquity to the present time, it has been regarded as the parent, par excel
Icnce. This was accepted by Renan, Whitney, Taylor, H. Paul, etc. ; rejected by M. Miiller
Breal, P. Regnaud, etc. No one disputes the formation of many words by onomatopoeia, but
those who question its value as a universal process say that "if in certain sounds of our idioms
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II. Leaving this question which, from its relation to that of
the origin of speech, shares in the same obscurity, we have further
to ask if the primitive terms (whatever nature be attributed to
them) were, properly speaking, words or phrases? Did man ini-
tially give utterance to simple denominations, or to affirmations and
negations? On this point all linguists seem to be in agreement.
"Speech must express a judgment." In other words it is always
a phrase. "Language is based on the phrase, not on the single
word: we do not think by means of words, but by means of
phrases."^
This phrase may be a single word,— or composite, formed by
confusion of words as in the so-called agglutinative, polysynthetic,
holophrastic languages,—or two words, subject and attribute ; or
three distinct words, subject, attribute, and copula ; but beneath
all these forms the fundamental function is unalterably to affirm or
deny.
The same remark has been made of children. "We must,"
says Preyer, "reject the general notion that children first em-
ploy substantives, and afterwards verbs. My son, at the age of
twenty-three months first used an adjective to express a judgment,
the first which he enunciated in his maternal tongue ; he said lieiss
(hot) for 'the milk is too warm.' Later on, the proposition was
made in two words: heim-tnimi, 'I want to go home and drink
some milk ' (//<?m=home, w/;;//=milk). Taine and some others
have cited several observations of the same order.
According to some authors, all language that has reached com-
plete development has perforce passed through the three succes-
sive periods of monosyllabism, polysynthetism, and analysis; so
that the idioms that remain monosyllabic or agglutinative would
correspond to an arrest in development. To others, this is a
hypothesis, only, to be rejected. However this may be (and it is
not a question that we need to examine), it seems rash to assert,
with Sayce, "that the division of the phrase into two parts, sub-
we seem to hear an imitation of the sounds of nature, we must recollect that the same noises are
represented by quite different sounds in other languages, which are also held by those who utter
them to be onomatopoeia. Thus it would be more just to say that we hear the sounds of nature
through the words to which our ear has been accustomed from infancy" (Breal). I have ob-
served that those who study the spontaneous formation of language in children, claim for them
little onomatopoeism. On the other hand, a word created by undoubted onomatopoeia is some-
times by means of association, or of strange analogies, transferred successively to so many ob-
jects that all trace of the transformations of meaning may be lost, and the imitative origin actu-
ally denied. Such was Darwin's case, before cited, where the onomatopoeia of the duck finally
served to designate all liquids, all that flies, all pieces of money. If the successive extensions of
the term had not been observed, who could have recovered its origin ?
1 Sayce, loc. cif., IV., §§ 3-5.
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ject and predicate, is a pure accident, and that if Aristotle had
been Mexican (the Aztec language was polysynthetic), his system
of logic would have assumed a totally different form." The ap-
pearance and evolution of analytical language is not pure accident,
but the result of mental development. It is impossible to pass
from synthesis to analysis without dividing, separating, and array-
ing the isolated parts in a certain order. The logic of a Mexican
Aristotle might have differed from our own in its form ; but it
could not have constituted itself without fracture of its linguistic
mould, without setting up a division, at least in theory, between
the elements of the discourse. The unconscious activity by which
certain idioms made towards analysis, and passed from the period
of envelopment to that of development, imposed upon them a suc-
cessive order. Polysynthetic languages have been likened to the
performance of children who want to say everything at once, their
ideas all surge up together and form a conglomeration. ^ Evidently
this method must be given up, or we must renounce all serious
progress in analysis.
To sum up the psychological value of the phrase, independ-
ently of its multiple forms, we may conclude by the following re-
marks of Max Miiller :
"We imagine that language is impossible without sentences,
and that sentences are impossible without the copula. This view
is both right and wrong. If we mean by sentence an utterance
consisting of several words, and a subject, and a predicate, and a
copula, it is wrong When the sentence consists only of sub-
ject and predicate, we may say that a copula is understood, but the
truth is that at first it was not expressed, it was not required to be
expressed; in primitive languages it was simply impossible to ex-
press it. To be able to say vii- est bonus, instead of vir bonus, is
one of the latest achievements of human speech. "-
The evolution of speech, starting from the protoplasmic state
without organs or functions, and acquiring them little by little, pro-
ceeding progressively from indefinite to definite, from fluid to fixed
state, can only be sketched in free outline. But the successive
points of this differentiation, which creates grammatical forms, and
1 There is in Iroquois a word that signifies, " I demand money from those who have come to
buy garments from me." Esquimaux is equally rich in terms of this sort. Yet we must recog-
nise that these immense composite words, themselves formed from abbreviated and fused words
virtually imply the beginning of decomposition.
1 Lectures on the Origin and Growth 0/ Religion, ed. iSgi, p. 196.
272 THE OPEN COURT.
parts of discourse, are under an objective form the history of the
development of intelligence, inasmuch as it abstracts, generalises,
analyses, and tends towards an ever-growing precision. The com-
pletely developed languages—and we are speaking only of such
—
bear throughout the print of the unconscious labor that has fash-
ioned them for centuries : they are a petrified psychology.
We must return to the roots or primitive terms, whatever may
be their nature. Two distinct categories are generally admitted :
pronominal or demonstrative roots, verbal or predicative roots.
The first form a small group that properly indicate rather the
relative position of the speaker, than any concrete quality. They
are equivalent to here, there, this, that, etc. They are few in num-
ber, and very simple in their phonetic relations: a vowel or vowel
followed by a consonant. Many linguists refuse to admit them as
roots, and think they have dropped from the second class by at-
tenuation of meaning. 1 Possibly they are a survival of gesture
language.
The second (verbal or predicative) is the only class that inter-
ests us. They have swarmed in abundance. They indicate qual-
ities or actions ; that is the important point. The first words de-
nominated attributes or modes of being ; they were adjectives, at
least in the measure in which a fixed and rigid terminology can be
applied to states in process of forming. Primitive man was every-
where struck with the qualities of things, ergo words were all orig-
inally appellative. They expressed one of the numerous character-
istics of each object; they translated a spontaneous and natural
abstraction : another proof of the precocious and indispensable na-
ture of this operation. From its earliest developments intelligence
has tended to simplify, to substitute the part for the whole. The
unconscious choice of one attribute among many others depends
on various causes ; doubtless on its predominance, but above all
on the interest it has for man. "A people," remarks Renan,
"have usually many words for what most interests them." Thus,
in Hebrew, we find 25 synonyms for the observance of the law; 14
for faith in God; 11 for rain, etc. In Arabic, the lion has 500
names, the serpent 200, money more than 80; the camel has 5,744,
the sword 1,000 as befits a warrior race. The Lapp whose lan-
guage is so poor, has more than 30 words to designate the rein-
deer, an animal indispensable to his life.- These so-called syno-
1 Whitney, The Li/e and Growth of Language, Chap. X. Sayce, op. cit., VI., 28, rejects them
absolutely.
2 Renan, Histoire ginirale des langues siniitiques, pp. 128 and 363.
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nyms each denominate a particular aspect of things ; they witness
to the abundance of primitive abstractions.
This apparent wealth soon becomes an embarrassment and an
encumbrance. Instead of loo distinct terms, one generic substan-
tive, plus one or two epithets, would sufifice. But the substantive
was not born of the deliberate desire to obviate this inconvenience.
It is a specialisation, a limitation of the primitive meaning. Little
by little the adjective lost its qualificative value, to become the
name of one of the objects qualified. Thus in Sanskrit deva (shin-
ing) finally signified the god; sourya (the dazzling) became the
sun ; akva (rapid) the name of a horse, etc. This metamorphosis
of adjective into substantive by a specialisation of the general
sense occurs even in our actual languages; as, e. g., when we say
in French tin brilliant (diamond) ; le volant (of a machine) ; tin bon
(of bread, counting-house, bank, etc.). What is only an accident
now was originally a constant process. Thus the substantive was
derived from the primitive adjective; or rather, within the primi-
tive organism, adjective-substantive, a division has been produced,
and two grammatical functions constituted.
Many other remarks could be made on the determination of
the substantive by inflexions, declensions, the mark of the gen-
der (masculine, feminine, neuter); I shall confine myself to what
concerns nujnber, since we are proposing to consider numeration
under all its aspects. Nothing appears more natural and clear-
cut than the distinction between one and several; as soon as we
exceed pure unity, the mother of numbers, plurality appears to
us to be homogeneous in all its degrees. It has not been so from
the beginning. This is proved by the existence of the dual in an
enormous number of languages: Aryan, Semitic, Turanian, Hot-
tentot, Australian, etc. One, two, were counted with precision ;
the rest was vague. According to Sayce, the word "three" in Ar-
yan language at first signified "what goes beyond." It has been
supposed that the dual was at first applied to the paired parts of
the body: the eyes, the arms, the legs. Intellectual progress
caused it to fall into disuse.
At the close of the period of first formation which we have
been considering, the sentence was only a defaced organism repro-
duced by one of the following forms: (i) that; (2) that shining;
(3) that sun, that shining. ^ The verb is still absent.
With it we enter on the period of secondary formation. It was
long held to be an indisputable dogma that the verb is the word
1 p. Regnaud, Origine et philosophic du lan^age, p. 317.
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par excellence {I'erbuvi), the necessary and exclusive instrument of
an affirmation. Yet there are many inferior idioms which dispense
with it, and express affirmation by crude, roundabout processes,
with no precision,—most frequently by a juxtaposition : snow
white= the snow is white; drink me wine= I drink (or shall
drink) wine, etc. Plenty of examples can be found in special
works.
In fact, the Indo-European verb is, by origin, an adjective (or
substantive) modified by a pronoun ; j5//(?;-^w/= carrier- me, I carry.
It is to be regretted that we cannot follow the details of this mar-
vellous construction,—the result of unconscious and collective
labor that has made of the verb a supple instrument, suited for all
expressions, by the invention of moods, voices, and tenses. We
may note that, as regards tenses, the distinction between the three
parts of duration (which seems to us so simple) appears to have
been established very slowly. Doubtless it can be asserted that it
existed, actually, in the mind of primitive man, but that the imper-
fection of his verbal instrument failed in translating it. However
this may be, it is a moot point whether the verb, at the outset, ex-
pressed past or present. It seems at first to have translated a
vague conception of duration, of continuity in action ; it was at
first "durative," a past which still continues, a past-present. The
adjective notion contained in the verb, indefinitely as to time, only
became precise by little and little. The distinction between the
moments of duration did not occur by the same process in all lan-
guages, and in some, highly developed, otherwise like the Semitic
languages, it remained very imperfect.^
The main point was to show how the adjective-substantive,
modified by the adjunction of pronominal elements, constituted
another linguistic organ, and losing its original mark little by little,
became the verb with its multiple functions. The qualificatory
character fundamental to it makes of it an instrument proper to
express all degrees of abstraction and generalisation from the high-
est to the lowest, to run up the scale of lower, medium, and higher
abstractions. Ex., to drink, eat, sleep, strike;—higher, to love,
pray, instruct, etc. ; higher still, to act, exist, etc. The supreme
degree of abstraction, i. e., the moment at which the verb is most
empty of all concrete sense, is found in the auxiliaries of the mod-
ern analytical languages. These, says Max Miiller, occupy the
same place among the verbs, as abstract nouns among the substan-
tives. They date from a later epoch, and all had originally a more
1 On this point, consult especially Sayce, op. cit., II., § 9, and P. Regnaud, op. at , pp. 296-299.
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material and more expressive character. Our auxiliary verbs had
to traverse a long series of vicissitudes, before they reached the
desiccated, lifeless form that makes them so appropriate to the
demands of our abstract prose. Habere, which is now employed
in all Roman languages to express simply a past time, at first sig-
nified "to hold fast," "to retain."
The author continues, retracing the history of several other
auxiliary verbs. Among them all there is one that merits particu-
lar mention on account of its divagations : this is the verb ctre,
v&xh par excellence, verb substantive, unique; direct or understood
expression of the existence that is everywhere present. The mo-
nopoly of affirmation, and even the privilege of an immaterial ori-
gin have been attributed to it.^ In the first place, it is not met
with under any form in certain languages which supplement its
absence by divers processes. In the second, it is far from being
primitive; it is derived, according to the idioms, from multiple
and sufficiently discordant elements : to breathe, live, grow (Max
Miiller) ; to breathe, grow, remain, stand upright {stare) (Whit-
ney).
Hitherto we have examined only the stable, solid parts of
speech. There remain such as are purely transitive, translating a
movement of thought, expressive of relation. Before we study
these under their linguistic form, it is indispensable to take up the
standpoint of pure psychology, and to know in the first place what
is the nature of a relation. This can the less be avoided inasmuch
as the question has scarcely been treated of, save by logicians, or
after their fashion, and many very complete treatises of psychology
do not bestow on it a single word.^
"A relation," says Herbert Spencer, "is a state of conscious-
ness which unites two other states of consciousness." Although a
relation is not always a link in the rigorous sense, this definition
has the great advantage of stating it as a reality, as a state that
exists by itself, not a zero, a naught of consciousness. It possesses
intrinsic characters : (i) It is indecomposable. There are in con-
sciousness greater and less states; the greater (e. g., a perception)
1 The word itre is irreducible, indecomposable, primitive, and wholly intellectual. I know
no language in which the French word t-trc is expressed by a corresponding word representing a
sensible idea. Hence it is not true that all the roots of the language are in last resort signs of
sensory ideas." (V. Cousin, Histoire de la phil. au XIII. Steele, 1841, H., p. 274.
2 For the psychology of relation consult Herbert Spencer, Psychology, I., p. 65, II., pp. 360 et
seq. ; James, Psychology, I., pp. 203 et seq. The latter gives the history of the subject, which is
very brief, and remarks that the idealogues form an honorable exception to the general absten-
tion. Thus Destutt de Tracy established a destinction between feelings of sensation and feelings
of relation.
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are composite, hence accessible to analysis ; they occupy an ap-
preciable and measurable time. The lesser (relation) are naturally
beyond analysis ; rapid as lightning, they appear to be outside
time. (2) It is dependent. Remove the two terms with which it
is intercalated, and the relation vanishes ; but it must be noted
that the terms themselves presuppose relations; for, according to
Spencer's just remark, "There are neither states of consciousness
without relations, nor relations without states of consciousness."
In fact : to feel or think a relation, is to feel or think a change.
But this psychical state may be studied otherwise than by in-
ternal observation, and the subsequent interpretation. It lends
itself to an objective study, because it is incarnated in certain words.
When I say, red and green, red or green, there are in either case,
not two, but three states of consciousness ; the sole difference is in
the intermediate state which corresponds with an inclusion or an
exclusion. So, too, all our prepositions and conjunctions (/^r, by,
if, but, because) envelop a mental state, however attenuated. The
study of languages us that the expression of relations is produced
in two ways, forming, as it were, two chronological layers.
The most ancient is that of the cases or declensions : a highly
complex mechanism, varying in marked degree with the idioms,
and consisting in appositions, suffixes, or modifications of the prin-
cipal theme.
But these relations have only acquired their proper linguistic
organ, specialised for this function, by means of prepositions and
conjunctions. They are wanting in many languages ; gesture being
then substituted for them. The principal parts of the discourse
are solitary, juxtaposed without links after the manner of the
phrases used by children. Others, somewhat less poor, have only
two conjunctions : and, but. In short, the terms on which de-
volved the expression of relations are of late formation, as it were,
organs de luxe. In the analytical languages, prepositions and con-
junctions are nouns or pronouns diverted from their primitive ac-
ceptation, which have acquired a value expressive of transition,
condition, subordination, co-ordination, and the rest. The psycho-
logical notion common to the greater number, if not to all, is that
of a movement. "All relations expressed by prepositions can be re-
ferred to repose, and to movement in space and time, i. e., to those
with which the locative, accusative (movement of approximation)
and ablative (movement of departure) correspond in declension." ^
It may be admitted that this consciousness of movement, of change,
1 Regnaud, op. cit., pp. 304 et seq.
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which is no more, fundamentally, than the sense of different direc-
tions of thought, belongs less to the category of clear notions than
to that of subconscious states, of tendencies, of actions, which ex-
plains why the terms of relation are wholly wanting, or rare, and
only conquered their autonomy at a late period.
With these, the progressive work of differentiation is accom-
plished. Discourse has now its materials and its cement ; it is
capable of complex phrases wherein all is referred and subordi-
nated to a principal state, contrary to those ruder essays which
could only attain to simple phrases, denuded of connective appa
ratus.
We have rapidly sketched this labor of organo-genesis, by
which language has passed from the amorphous state to the pro-
gressive constitution of specialised terms and grammatical func-
tions: an evolution wholly comparable with that which, in living
bodies, starts from the fecundated ovule, to attain by division of
labor among the higher species to a fixed adjustment of organs and
functions. "Languages are natural organisms, which, without
being independent of human volition, are born, grow, age, and
die, according to determined laws." (Schleicher.) They are in a
state of continuous renovation, of acquisition, and of loss, fn civ-
ilised languages, this incessant metamorphosis is partially checked
by enforced instruction, by tradition, and respect for the great lit-
erary works. In savage idioms where these coercive measures are
lacking, the transformation at times occurs with such rapidity that
they become unrecognisable at the end of a few generations.
Spoken language, as a psycho-physiological mechanism, is
regulated in its evolution by physiological and psychological laws.
Among the former (with which we are not concerned), the
principal is the law of phonetic alteration, consisting in the dis-
placement of an articulation in a determined direction. It is de-
pendent on the vocal organ; thus, after the Germanic invasion,
the Latin which this people spoke fell again under the power of
physiological influences which modified it profoundly.
Among the latter, the principal is the law of analogy, the
great artisan in the extension of languages. It is a law of economy,
the basis of which is generalisation, the faculty of seizing on real
or supposed resemblances. The word remains invariable, but the
mind gives it different applications: it is a mask covering in turn
several faces. It suffices to open a dictionary to see how ingenious
and perilous is this unconscious labor. Such a word has only a
few lines ; it has no brilliant record. Such another fills pages ;
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first we see it in its primitive sense; then—from analogy to anal-
ogy—from accident to accident— it departs from it more and more,
and ends by having quite a contrary meaning.^ Hence it has been
said that "the object of a true etymology is to discover the laws that
have regulated the evolution of thought." Among primitive peo-
ple, the process that entails such deviations from the primitive
sense, is sometimes of striking absurdity ; or at least appears to us
as such by reason of the strange analogies that serve the extension
of the word. Thus : certain Australian tribes gave the names of
mussels {/iniyum'), to books because they open and close like shell-
fish; and many other no less singular facts could be cited. Much
more might be said as to the role of analogy, but we must adhere
to our subject.
In conclusion: it is to be regretted that linguistic psychology
attracts so few people, and that many recent treatises on psychol-
ogy, excellent on all other points, do not devote a single line to
language. Yet this study, especially if comparative, from the low-
est to the most subtle, would throw at least as much light on the
mechanism of the intelligence as other highly accredited processes.
Physiological psychology is pursued with ardor, on the right sup-
position that if the facts of biology, normal and morbid, are studied
by the naturalists and the doctors, they may be so also by the psy-
chologists, after their mode. So too for languages; comparative
philology has its aim, psychology another proper to it. It is im-
possible to believe that any one, armed with sufficient linguistic in-
struction, who consecrates himself to this task, will expend his
labor in vain.
1 It is superfluous to give examples of such a well-known fact. See Darmesteter, The Life of
IVords.
